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Attitudes towards income inequality: Polarisation between the 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the perceived meritocracy 
 
Abstract 
Individuals with a higher social position are more tolerant of current income inequality than 
individuals with a lower social position. Besides this, attitudes towards income inequality are 
influenced by inequality-legitimising myths in a given society. Little is known about how 
these two factors interact. This study combines these two lines of research and argues that 
different social strata are more polarised in their attitudes towards inequality in societies with 
strong prevalent meritocratic perceptions. We expect lower-status individuals (i.e. with a 
lower income or education) to experience a threat to their group esteem and therefore be less 
likely to support their society’s inequalities in societies with such strong meritocratic 
perceptions. This hypothesis was tested using data from the International Social Survey 
Programme 2009 (Social Inequality) on 39 countries. The results show that different social 
strata are indeed more polarised in their attitudes towards inequality in societies where 
meritocratic perceptions are more prevalent. Our results are robust for income, but not for 
education. This suggests that in perceived meritocracies, people regard income as the primary 
indicator of effort and ability.  
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Income inequality has been rising sharply within many countries across the world and has 
increasingly become the subject of substantial public concerns (Oxfam, 2014; World 
Economic Forum, 2014). Attitudes towards income inequality1 differ between individuals and 
groups within societies, as well as between societies (Kluegel and Smith, 1981; Larsen, 2016; 
Redmond et al., 2002). For instance, in Portugal and many Eastern European countries, many 
people consider the current level of income inequality to be too high, whereas this view is less 
common in the Nordic countries, the US and the Philippines (Hadler, 2005; Larsen, 2016; 
Redmond et al., 2002). Within countries, one determinant of attitudes towards inequality is 
social position. Consistently with the structural position thesis (Hadler, 2005), support for the 
current level of income inequality is stronger among those with a higher social position, e.g. 
individuals from the higher-income and more highly educated groups (Larsen, 2016; Osberg 
and Smeeding, 2006). 
Interestingly, this stratified polarisation in attitudes towards inequality is considerably 
stronger in some countries than in others (Brandt, 2013; Hadler, 2005; Larsen, 2016; Osberg 
and Smeeding, 2006), but the reasons for these differences remain unclear. This study 
responds to recent calls for further investigation into this issue (Ku and Salmon, 2013; Osberg 
and Smeeding, 2006).  
Another determinant of attitudes towards inequality is the set of beliefs people hold 
regarding the causes of inequality (e.g. Hadler, 2005; Larsen, 2016). When income 
distribution is perceived as meritocratic2, the inequalities that result from this are thought to 
be more easily legitimized (Cojocaru, 2014; Hadler, 2005; Kluegel and Smith, 1981; Larsen, 
2016; Redmond et al., 2002; Reynolds and Xian, 2014). Meritocracy is widely endorsed in 
many societies (Marshall et al., 1999; Redmond et al., 2002), especially since the rise of 
neoliberalism and its notions of individual responsibility. In a meritocracy, income and social 
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position are allocated according to effort and ability, while criteria such as family background 
or race are unimportant. Meritocracy’s promise of equality of opportunity is of greater 
fairness concern to people than equality of outcomes (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; Janmaat, 
2013; Reynolds and Xian, 2014).  
Little is known, however, about how these often contrasted determinants of attitudes 
towards inequality – people’s social position and a society’s meritocratic perceptions – 
interact. Prevalent meritocratic perceptions can provide a powerful legitimation of inequality, 
but they can also challenge the group esteem of the lower social strata and therefore lower 
their approval of the inequalities. We propose that the polarisation in attitudes towards 
inequality between different social strata may be larger in societies that are popularly 
perceived as more meritocratic. Examining the possibility of resistance despite the presence of 
prevalent inequality-legitimizing discourses may provide key insights for this theoretical 
debate.  
Over the last few decades, policymakers and news media have helped spread the 
message that their societies are meritocratic (e.g. Brown, 2002). Benefit sanctions and 
workfare policy could implicitly communicate to individuals that being poor is a consequence 
of their lack of effort to get well-remunerated jobs. Although meritocratic perceptions have 
become more prevalent around the world, the degree to which they have done so differs 
between countries (Larsen, 2016; Marshall et al., 1999; Redmond et al., 2002).  Previous 
studies show that meritocratic perceptions are particularly widespread in Scandinavia, New 
Zealand and Peru, but weak in Brazil, Argentina and Eastern Europe (Bucca, 2016; Larsen, 
2016; Marshall et al., 1999; Redmond et al., 2002). 
There are important reasons to expect that the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the perceived 
meritocratic distribution will respond differently to these dominant beliefs about inequality. In 
a society with strong meritocratic perceptions, a low income and level of education are 
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commonly taken as signs of a lack of ability or laziness, while a high income and level of 
education are seen as indicating resourcefulness and hard work (Kampen, Elshout and 
Tonkens, 2013; Sennett, 2003; Young, 1958). As a result, the prevalence of meritocratic 
perceptions in society has different implications for the self-esteem of different groups, and 
meritocratic ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ may differ in their inclination to support the status quo 
(Han et al., 2012) and accept inequality (Spears et al., 2010). It is likely that when such 
perceptions are more prevalent in a society, they pose an additional challenge on the esteem of 
lower status individuals. Studying these processes is of increasing importance, because they 
may account for the increasing support for populist right-wing parties – who seem to exploit 
this challenged self-esteem. 
Our main research question is whether the polarisation in attitudes towards income 
inequality between higher and lower strata is related to the prevalence of meritocratic 
perceptions in society. Or, phrased in other words, whether the relationship between income 
or level of education and tolerance for income inequality is moderated by the prevalence of 
meritocratic perceptions. To answer this question, we used the latest International Social 
Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Social Inequality data (2009) and conducted multi-level 
regression analyses on 39 countries.  
 
Stronger polarisation in perceived meritocracies 
Individuals who have a high income or level of education are likely to support high levels of 
inequality in society in order to sustain or even further their privileged position. This 
structural position thesis (Hadler, 2005) has indeed been confirmed in earlier research 
(Gijsberts, 2002; Kelley and Evans, 1993; Larsen, 2016; Osberg and Smeeding, 2006). For 
instance, low-status individuals have been found to be less satisfied with the current system 
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and more supportive of hierarchy-reducing policies (Zimmerman and Reyna, 2013), and they 
are less likely than high-status individuals to support the current system (Brandt, 2013).  
Apart from their own status position, people’s attitudes are also driven by fairness and 
ideological concerns (Cojocaru, 2014; Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). 
Fairness-driven individuals are thought to accept a high degree of income inequality if it is 
seen to result from a fair distributive process (Cojocaru, 2014; Janmaat, 2013; Larsen, 2016; 
Osberg and Smeeding, 2006). For example, strong perceptions of corruption and weak 
meritocratic perceptions may explain the relatively low support for current levels of income 
inequality among Eastern Europeans (Larsen, 2016; Redmond, 2002; Suhrcke, 2001). In the 
current study, however, it is argued that although meritocracy is a widely endorsed ideal, there 
are contexts in which individuals who perceive society as meritocratic do reject the current 
income inequality in their society: when they have a low status in a society with strongly 
prevalent meritocratic perceptions.  
Social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) emphasizes the importance 
people place on being able to maintain or achieve a positive social identity and prestige. 
Members of lower social strata may oppose practices that challenge their group’s positive 
social identity (Han et al., 2012; Spears et al., 2010; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Societies with 
strong meritocratic perceptions that justify the disadvantage experienced by the lower strata, 
challenge the social identity of lower-status people. The stronger a society’s meritocratic 
perceptions, the greater the stigma faced by lower-status individuals and the greater the praise 
received by higher-status individuals. If the society’s meritocratic perceptions are especially 
strong, they may have a strong effect on individuals’ tolerance of inequality depending on 
their social position beyond people’s own beliefs and perceptions about meritocracy. 
According to SIT, lower-status individuals can respond to the stigma they face through three 
possible strategies: social mobility, social creativity and social action (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel 
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and Turner, 1979). Which of these strategies is pursued depends on the permeability of group 
boundaries and the degree to which inequality is stable and seen as legitimate (e.g. Ellemers, 
1993).  
SIT assumes that social mobility – the attempt by individuals to become members of 
more advantaged groups – is the strategy that members of the disadvantaged group will 
pursue first (Ellemers, 1993), an assumption that is plausible in capitalist cultures where 
people’s concerns are primarily individualistic. The appeal of this strategy depends on the 
permeability of group boundaries. According to prevalent belief, group boundaries are more 
permeable in a meritocracy (Ellemers, 1993), but also in such societies upward social mobility 
is not open to everyone.  
Another coping strategy is social creativity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), which consists 
in the enhancement of the group rather than of the individual. Aspects on which the in-group 
is inferior are downplayed while aspects in which the group may be superior are highlighted. 
For instance, low-status individuals can downplay the importance of a high income and its 
associated positive attributes, such as strong marketable abilities, and argue that the poor are 
actually superior in more important regards, such as honesty. They do not necessarily 
disapprove of the income distribution, but of the importance of a high income for a positive 
identity. This is in fact one coping strategy through which lower status individuals who 
believe to live in a meritocratic society, can come to morally disagree with some aspects the 
meritocratic income distribution. Such an aspect could be the narrow emphasis on marketable 
abilities only, or the moral rejection of the very importance of effort and ability altogether 
(Swierstra and Tonkens, 2008; Sennett, 2003). This is also indicated in qualitative studies of 
the long-term unemployed whose esteem was challenged by the prevalent meritocratic 
ideology (Kampen et al., 2013). Based on their partial moral rejection of the meritocratic 
ideal, these individuals then reject the resulting inequalities.  
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Social action, the third strategy, consists of collective attempts to challenge the social 
order. These attempts can take highly visible forms, like protesting or organising in unions, 
but also more subtle forms such as simply expressing disapproval of the current level of 
inequality (Spears et al., 2010). This study focuses on the extent to which low status 
individuals respond to a negative social identity by engaging in social action rather than social 
creativity  – namely by disapproving of the current level of income inequality.  
Social action and creativity are argued to be most likely when group boundaries are 
relatively impermeable (Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg and Wilke, 1990). 
Because such a context provides little chance for disadvantaged individuals to move into 
higher positions, they become more focused on the group’s collective interests (Ellemers, 
1993). Social action is also said to be more likely to occur when the social order is unstable. 
When the social order is stable, there is little point for disadvantaged individuals to engage in 
collective social action. Finally, social action is more likely to occur when the social ordering 
is generally considered as illegitimate (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This would imply that social 
action would be especially undertaken by those lower status individuals who personally do 
not share the prevalent belief to live in a meritocracy. However, the current study disagrees on 
that point and adopts a more nuanced perspective of SIT (Spears et al., 2010). Here it is 
proposed that people can also engage in social action when they themselves share the 
prevalent justifying explanations of inequalities. This subjective assessment by individuals of 
the state of ‘what is’ (e.g. ‘society is meritocratic’) does not necessarily mean that they 
morally endorse this perceived status quo (e.g. ‘it should be meritocratic’) (Marshall et al., 
1999). For example, Spears et al. (2010) show that in societies where inequalities are 
presented as legitimate, members of the disadvantaged groups do resist against this, for 
example by challenging negative stereotypes. Moreover, these individuals have a stronger 
tendency to do so than their counterparts in a condition presented as ‘illegitimate’.  
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Extrapolating from this finding, we could argue that in societies with strong 
meritocratic perceptions (i.e. a strong legitimation of inequality), lower-status groups can be 
expected to be even more critical of current inequalities than their counterparts in societies 
where meritocratic perceptions are weak. In fact, we expect that lower status individuals (also 
those who share the prevalent belief that their society is meritocratic), will be induced to 
morally criticize aspects of the meritocratic ideal – and therefore the inequalities – just as 
Michael Young (1958) expected. They are induced to do so by the negative external pressure 
on their group esteem as a result of the negative image of the bottom that is implied in 
prevalent meritocratic perceptions. Getting rid of one’s personal belief that a lower status 
position is a result of meritocratic factors does not exempt one from exposure to this negative 
external gaze. People still remain susceptible to how they are viewed by others (e.g. Elster, 
2009). Even when lower status individuals do not agree with the meritocratic stereotypes, they 
are still sensitive to this negative gaze - just as lower status individuals who do believe society 
is indeed meritocratic.  
We would therefore expect more polarisation between the social strata in attitudes 
towards income inequality in societies with strong meritocratic perceptions. This new reading 
of SIT by Spears et al. (2010) recognizes that disadvantaged individuals can disapprove the 
inequalities even if these inequalities are presented as the result of differences in ability or 
performance and therefore as legitimized. Because of the stigmatizing implications for their 
group esteem, disadvantaged individuals will morally criticize the meritocratic justification of 
inequalities, also when they share the belief that the inequalities came about meritocratically. 
Thus, in contrast to the external meritocratic justification of inequality, disadvantaged 
individuals tend to internally reject meritocracy as a proper justification for their 
disadvantage. Spears et al. (2010) even expect the disadvantaged to be more likely to resist the 
status quo when external legitimisation of inequalities is strong, although it should be noted 
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that this resistance will be more subtle than in more action-based measures such as 
participating in protests. Whereas prevalent meritocratic perceptions may erode the positive 
working class consciousness required for lower status groups to visibly protest inequality 
(Kluegel and Smith, 1981), they still invoke more subtle expressions of dissent because they 
impose a negative social identity. 
In contrast to the lower strata, the esteem of the higher strata is reinforced by prevalent 
meritocratic perceptions of them as ‘winners’ who have achieved their high status through 
their own talent and effort. This higher esteem encourages members of the higher strata to 
even more strongly endorse the status quo. This again implies that polarisation in attitudes 
towards inequality between social strata is stronger in societies with stronger meritocratic 
perceptions. 
We argue that income and education are primary markers of meritocratic success or 
failure. In a perceived meritocracy, economic and educational position are assumed to be 
determined through individual ability and effort, and income or education become signs of 
one’s ability and effort (Sennett, 2003; Young, 1958). Indeed, greater importance is placed on 
educational degrees in societies with a greater meritocratic focus on standardised rankings and 
the assessment of individual abilities because educational degrees are seen as facilitating 
standardised assessments of quality regardless of race and other non-meritocratic factors 
(Neves, 2000). In sum, we expect that: 
A higher income or level of education is related to higher support for income 
inequality, whereas a lower income or level of education is more strongly related to lower 
support for income inequality. This polarisation in attitudes towards inequality is stronger in 





Data and methods 
To test this hypothesis, we used the ISSP’s Social Inequality data (2009), a particularly rich 
data source on attitudes towards inequality based on standardised data collection with 
probability-stratified sampling to ensure cross-national comparability  (Gendall, 2011). Our 
working sample consists of 45,699 individuals in 39 countries. On average, 1,172 respondents 
were available per country. Working sample sizes ranged from 726 for Finland to 2,796 for 
South Africa. Table 1 here shows the descriptive statistics for our variables, and Tables 1 and 
2 in the Online appendix show correlations between key independent variables. 
 
[TABLE 1 here] 
Attitudes towards current levels of income inequality 
To measure the dependent variable, individuals’ attitude towards current levels of income 
inequality, we used the available five-point Likert item asking respondents about the extent 
they think that ‘income differences [in country] are too large’. The previous literature was 
closely followed in our operationalisation of the variable (Larsen, 2016), which we coded 
such that higher values represent stronger approval of the current level of income inequality3.  
 
Socio-economic position: income and education 
To measure the key micro-level independent variable, socio-economic position, we used two 
indicators. The first indicator, income position, was measured by asking respondents to self-
define their income position on a scale from 1 (bottom) to 10 (top). Thus, income was here 
operationalised as individuals’ country-specific relative income position. The second 
indicator, educational attainment, was measured by asking respondents how many years of 
education they had completed. To enable sensible calculations with this variable, we applied 
the following recoding: individuals who were still in school were assumed to have had 13 
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years of education (eight years of primary education and five years of secondary education), 
whereas individuals who were still in college or university were assumed to have had 15 years 
of education (eight years of primary education, six years of secondary education and one year 
of further education). We set the limit at 24 years of education (which corresponds to having a 
postgraduate degree: eight years of primary schooling, six years of secondary schooling and 
ten years of further education); all respondents who indicated that they had completed more 
years of education were recoded as having 24 years of education. This measure has the 
advantage over educational categories that it is continuous and information loss is therefore 
minimalised. At the same time, however, the length of educational trajectories may differ 
cross-nationally, which could introduce some error into the measure. Nevertheless, these 
cross-national differences are likely to be small. The results were checked against the 
alternative measure of educational degree, which led to similar results4. 
  
Meritocratic perceptions 
The key macro-level independent variable is countries’ prevalence of meritocratic 
perceptions. In the literature, meritocratic perceptions have been measured by asking people 
to estimate the importance of several meritocratic (e.g. hard work) and/or non-meritocratic 
(e.g. race) factors in determining people’s social status (Bucca, 2016; Larsen, 2016; Marshall 
et al., 1999; Redmond et al., 2002; Reynolds and Xian, 2014). We aimed to closely replicate 
recently used measures, especially the measure used by Larsen (2016). Since his five-item 
scale only measures people’s estimated importance of non-meritocratic factors, we added the 
three available items on the estimated importance of meritocratic factors in the 2009 ISSP (i.e. 
the first three items in the following list). Respondents were asked to rate ‘how important you 
think it is for getting ahead in life…’ of the following attributes: ‘having a good education 
yourself’; ‘having ambition‘; ‘hard work‘; ‘coming from a wealthy family’; ‘knowing the 
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right people’; ‘having political connections’; ‘having well-educated parents’ and ‘giving 
bribes’. Respondents could indicate their estimated importance, ranging from ‘essential’ to 
‘not important at all’ on a five-point scale. In total, our eight-item scale has an inter-item 
reliability of Cronbach’s alpha of .73. Table 3 (Online Appendix) shows the correlations 
between the items of the meritocratic perceptions scale. We recoded scores such that higher 
values indicate higher meritocratic perceptions. Then, for each respondent we calculated the 
mean score. In calculating this mean, we excluded respondents with more than two missing 
items (N = 566). To obtain countries’ prevalence of meritocratic perceptions, we calculated 
respondents’ average score on this scale for each country.  
 
Control variables and robustness checks 
At the individual level, we controlled for three socio-demographic factors,  age, gender and 
employment status, since both attitudes towards the current inequalities and meritocratic 
perceptions have been shown to differ between men and women, age groups and employment 
statuses (Bucca, 2016; Larsen, 2016; Reynolds and Xian, 2014). In addition, we controlled for 
individuals’ personal meritocratic perceptions (and in a robustness check for its potential 
interaction effect with income and education) in order to single out the distinct contextual 
effect of living in a society with prevalent meritocratic perceptions.  
Moreover, we controlled for individuals’ view that they lived in a middle class society, 
because this view is also related to both tolerance of inequality and meritocratic perceptions 
(Larsen, 2016). We followed Larsen (2016) in the operationalisation of this variable. It was 
measured through an item in which respondents were presented five diagrams of possible 
income distributions in a society. Respondents were asked to indicate which diagram they 
thought most closely approximated their society. Respondents who picked the diagram with 
most people located in the middle, were here operationalised as believing that they lived in a 
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middle class society. The variable we used was a dummy variable, distinguishing individuals 
who held this view (1) from individuals who believed they lived in a society with other shapes 
of income distribution (0).  
Another important control variable is social mobility. Individuals’ history of social 
mobility may influence their belief that they live in a meritocracy, as well as their view on 
current income inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). People’s perception on their social 
mobility likely has a greater influence than their objective social mobility on how meritocratic 
perceptions affect their group esteem. Therefore, we used a measure of subjective social 
mobility. Respondents indicated their own income position and that of their family of 
upbringing on a scale from 1 to 10. We subtracted the respondents’ position from that of their 
family of upbringing (‘Where did the family that you grew up in, fit in then?’), similarly to 
previous research on the same data (Larsen, 2016). Individuals whose current income position 
was higher than that of their family of upbringing, were coded as ‘socially upwardly mobile’. 
Those with a negative score (a lower current position than that of their family) were coded as 
‘socially downwardly mobile’. Individuals whose current position equalled that of their family 
were coded as stable. We used a dummy variable for each category. We are aware that this is 
not a measure of class mobility, because individuals did not rank themselves on clearly 
defined class categories.  
 
At the country level, we controlled for economic output (GDP), the level of income 
inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) and the degree of upward social mobility. 
Economic output may reflect countries’ wealth, which is likely related to both meritocratic 
perceptions and attitudes towards inequality (Hadler, 2005), but it is an imperfect 
approximation of national wealth. We controlled for the Gini coefficient to capture the extent 
to which wealth measured in terms of GDP is equally distributed across society. We used 
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World Bank data to derive countries’ GDP for 2009 and the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) to derive countries’ Gini-coefficient based on the post-tax 
disposable household income (Solt, 2014). The SWIID provides the largest set of reliable 
cross-nationally comparable estimates of income inequality (more information about these 
data can be found in Solt, 2009). We used the Gini-estimates based on the post-tax disposable 
household income. Finally, the incidence of upward social mobility was measured by 
calculating for each country the proportion of respondents whose self-reported income 
position was higher than the position they reported for their family of upbringing. 
In a robustness check, we verified that the results were not affected when the outcome 
variable was treated dichotomously: inequality-tolerant individuals, i.e. respondents who 
(strongly) disagreed with the above-mentioned statement were scored as a one, others as zero 
(see Online Appendix Table 4).  
However, the prevalent perception in a country is not necessarily captured by the 
aggregated mean of individual responses. For instance, views could be highly polarised. 
Indeed, countries differ in the degree to which there is consensus or polarisation on views 
about inequality (Hadler, 2005). Moreover, even individuals themselves may not have a 
uniform view regarding inequality: people can have inconsistent views on reality, which are 
reflected in their answers to the various scale items (Reynolds and Xian, 2014). Therefore, we 
conducted a robustness check with an alternative measure, taking the share of respondents in 
each country who consistently believed their society to be meritocratic5 (Online appendix 
Table 5). 
In another robustness check, we also controlled for cross-level interactions with the 
three controls at the country level (GDP, proportion upward mobility and Gini), as they could 
in fact be alternative explanations for any supportive findings for our hypothesis. We also 
checked for the potential interaction between people’s individual meritocratic perceptions and 
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their social position in a robustness check (Online appendix Table 6 and 7). This to ensure 
that our cross-national interaction could not be attributed merely to the compositional effect of 
having more or less individuals that perceive society to be meritocratic. 
Finally, we propose a falsification test. Our theoretical distinction between 
meritocratic ‘winners’ and ’losers’ implies that meritocratic perceptions increase the 
polarisation of attitudes towards inequality along some lines (income and education), but not 
along others. Therefore, we checked the interaction between gender and prevalent meritocratic 
perceptions (Online Appendix Table 8).  
 
Methods 
We employed linear multilevel regression analyses. Multilevel modelling takes account of the 
nested structure of individuals within countries and correspondingly adjusts the size of the 
standard errors (Hox, 2002). We also checked whether the effects of social position vary 
significantly between countries. Model 1 includes all the control and independent variables. 
Model 2 then includes the cross-level interaction term between individuals’ social position 
and the prevalence of meritocratic perceptions. None of the variables introduced 
multicollinearity issues (see Online Appendix Tables 1 and 2).  
As can be seen in Figure 1 and 2a-b, prevalent meritocratic perceptions, polarisation 
on attitudes towards income inequality, as well as the general inequality tolerance, differ 
across countries. Meritocratic perceptions are strongly endorsed in Australia, New Zealand 
and the UK, followed by the Nordic countries and the US. Interestingly, these are countries 
where the polarisation between income and educational groups is relatively large. Low on 
both variables are China and most Eastern European countries. Inequality tolerance is highest 
in the Philippines, Norway and Denmark, and lowest in Hungary, Ukraine and Italy.   
[FIGURE 1  here] 
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Table 2 displays the direction, magnitude and statistical significance of the associations 
between income (and education) and inequality tolerance, including interactions. Model 1 
shows the coefficients for the main independent and control variables on individuals’ attitudes 
towards current levels of income inequality. Net of several socio-demographic factors, the 
results show that a higher income is associated with a higher inequality tolerance (b = .074; p 
< .001). This income-based difference in inequality tolerance is modest, given that the 
majority of respondents had an inequality tolerance between 1 and 2. However, the significant 
random slope for income indicates that the relationship between income and inequality 
tolerance varies between countries. Apart from income, education is also positively correlated 
with inequality tolerance, although marginally (b = .006, p < .100). This overall association 
between education and inequality tolerance differs between countries, as indicated by the 
significant random slope. Finally, inequality tolerance is higher among individuals with 
meritocratic perceptions of their society and for those who believe they live in a middle-class 
society. When meritocratic perceptions are more prevalent in a society, inequality tolerance 
tends to be higher as well (b = .817, p < .01), even when individual meritocratic perceptions 
are controlled for. 
 
[TABLE 2 over here] 
Model 2a shows that this general positive effect of prevalent meritocratic perceptions 
on inequality tolerance is not uniform across the income spectrum. Polarisation between 
higher- and lower-income individuals in attitudes towards income inequality is stronger when 
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meritocratic perceptions are more prevalent. For example, moving (hypothetically) from the 
country where meritocratic perceptions are least prevalent (China, 3.05) to the country where 
they are most prevalent (New Zealand, 3.92) corresponds to a .132 points greater polarisation 
between income groups on attitudes towards income inequality. Figure 3 displays this 
interaction graphically and shows the increase in the income coefficient (or the polarisation 
between low and high incomes; y-axis) when meritocratic perceptions are more prevalent (x-
axis). The size of the income-coefficient in countries with strong prevalent meritocratic 
perceptions is significantly higher than in low-scoring countries. As well, the confidence 
intervals (dashed lines in the figure) in countries with weak and strong prevalent meritocratic 
perceptions (i.e. at the left and right edges of the x-axis, respectively) do not overlap. Because 
individuals typically do not differ more than one point in their inequality tolerance, this 
moderation on polarisation is quite large. The significant decline in log-likelihood indicates 
that adding this interaction term is a model improvement ( -2Log Likelihood difference 
between Model 1 and 2b: Dif – 2LL = 8.684,   df = 1).  
 
[FIGURE 3 here] 
 
Finally, Model 2b substitutes the income interaction term with an education interaction 
term and tests the remaining part of our hypothesis. The interaction term for education did not 
significantly improve the model fit (Dif – 2LL Model 1 and 2b = -2.859, df = 1). The results 
show that polarisation regarding inequality tolerance between the higher and less highly 
educated is stronger in societies with stronger meritocratic perceptions. With each one-unit 
increase in the prevalence of meritocratic perceptions, polarisation between educational 
groups regarding attitudes towards income inequality increases by .040 points (p < .05). 
Comparing the two countries with the weakest and strongest prevalent meritocratic 
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perceptions, polarisation in attitudes differs .035 points. This is a much smaller moderating 
effect than our findings on income. Figure 4 displays the interaction effect graphically, 
showing a smaller difference in the education coefficient (polarisation between the less and 
more highly educated) between countries scoring low and high on prevalent meritocratic 
perceptions.  
 
[FIGURE 4 here] 
 
Robustness checks  
The Online Appendix displays the results of additional robustness checks. Using a 
dichotomous outcome variable (Online appendix Table 4) and an alternative measure of the 
prevalence of meritocratic perceptions (Online appendix Table 5) does not affect the results.  
In addition, alternative explanations for the results obtained did not affect the results, 
except for education: whereas the main analyses showed a small statistically significant 
coefficient for the interaction effect between education and meritocratic perceptions, this 
effect lost statistical significance in the robustness models. Finally, the falsification test shows 
that there is no interaction between prevalent meritocratic perceptions and ‘irrelevant’ lines of 
distinction (gender) (Online Appendix Table 8).  
 
 
Conclusion   
In this study, we investigated the relationship between prevalent meritocratic perceptions and 
the degree of polarisation between social strata on attitudes towards income inequality. 
Following a new reading of social identity theory (Spears et al., 2010), we expected that while 
prevalent meritocratic perceptions can serve as a strong ‘external’ legitimisation of inequality, 
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this legitimising framework can induce subtle resistance (social action) in low-status 
individuals. Prevalent meritocratic perceptions can impose serious challenges to their group 
esteem, while the group esteem of the ‘winners’ may be additionally bolstered. The 
meritocratic ‘winners’ were expected to be the strongest supporters of their society’s income 
inequality.  
Our results support this expectation. Overall, lower strata more strongly disapprove of 
income inequality, and this tendency is stronger in societies with strong meritocratic 
perceptions. Country-differences in prevalent meritocratic perceptions can indeed explain the 
large differences between countries in the stratified polarisation on attitudes towards 
inequality (e.g.  Hadler, 2005).  
As predicted, this result applies regardless of individuals’ own meritocratic 
perceptions. In addition, amongst alternative determinants, such as the level of inequality in 
society, prevalent meritocratic perceptions had the strongest impact on the degree of 
polarisation in attitudes towards inequality.  
In the face of a negative social identity, low-status individuals appear to remain loyal 
to their group and defend its respectability. This holds even for individuals who themselves 
believe that society is meritocratic. These outcomes give way to a more nuanced reading of 
SIT by showing that disadvantaged groups are resilient against the prevalent discourse and 
inequality when their esteem is challenged. Possibly, these individuals reject the superior 
salience of meritocratic factors for status and respect and demand that other dimensions be 
valued more highly.  
The results therefore may have some important implications for the future of the ideal 
of meritocracy in developed societies. Its own paradox (i.e. equality of opportunities but 
inequality in access to esteem) can eventually lead to wide criticism among those deprived 
from group esteem – the ‘meritocratic losers’ – and, potentially, to a wide retreat of many 
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people from the meritocratic rat race towards prioritizing non-market domains not ruled by 
competition. 
As indicated before, people may believe that an individual’s income is determined by a 
combination of factors, and a robustness check examined the national share of individuals 
who believe that income is solely determined by meritocratic factors. Greater prevalence of 
this more ‘strict’ meritocratic view indeed bolstered income-based polarisation on attitudes 
towards income inequality (Online Appendix Table 5).  
Moreover, within countries the population can be divided in terms of meritocratic 
perceptions. As a result, the mean level of prevalence of these perceptions is not the best 
measure of comparison between countries. A robustness check ensured that the results were 
not mainly a result of cross-national differences in polarisation on meritocratic perceptions 
(Online Appendix Table 5). Even if the population is divided among how the incomes are 
distributed, individual attitudes are still affected when the group of of people who strongly 
perceive the distributive process as meritocratic, is larger.  
Most people in the dataset had a modest to very low inequality tolerance. This implies 
that the results on the effect of meritocratic perceptions and income should be interpreted as 
mainly relevant for the difference between having a very low versus a modest tolerance for 
inequality. Our robustness check with a dichotomous dependent variable indicates that the 
theorised patterns also matter for the difference between strong versus medium and low 
support for the current level of inequality (Online Appendix Table 4).   
By concentrating on attitudes towards the current level of income inequality, we 
focused on one of the two collective strategies theorised by SIT, the (subtle) social action 
strategy of lower-status groups. Determining whether this alternative reading is correct 
requires further research, for instance by conducting experiments that explicate the exact 
strategy employed by lower-status groups. In addition, it is required to have a close listen to 
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these people concerned. Although the findings in this study indeed do resonate strongly with 
previous findings based on qualitative fieldwork (e.g. Kampen et al., 2013), more future 
qualitative work is highly recommended on the theoretical mechanisms that were strongly 
suggested by this study. 
In contrast to income-based polarisation, education-based polarisation was not 
influenced by the prevalence of meritocratic perceptions. Therefore it is premature to 
conclude that strong meritocratic perceptions also strengthen education-based polarisation in 
attitudes towards inequality. Precisely because a high level of education should be a ticket to a 
high-paying job in a meritocracy, failure to obtain such a job can be painfully stigmatising for 
the highly educated. Possibly, a high level of education is not a sufficient mark of 
achievement in a perceived meritocracy. In this light, future research could study polarisation 
in attitudes towards education-based inequality, next to attitudes towards income inequality. 
Unfortunately, the ISSP dataset did not cover this topic.  
It should be noted that our macro-level and micro-level measures of meritocratic perceptions 
are partially dependent, because the macro-level measure is based on aggregated scores on the 
latter. For this reason, this study controlled for the influence of individual perceptions to 
distinguish the genuine contextual effect of prevalent meritocratic perceptions. A result from 
our analyses that turns out to be relevant for current debates is that strong individual 
meritocratic perception also reduce the tendency among lower-income individuals to support 
income inequality compared to people with higher incomes, apart from the overall prevalence 
of meritocratic perceptions. This finding strongly resonates with earlier experimental findings 
by Ku and Salmon (2013). In their experiment, a random distribution of remunerations 
generated more support for disadvantageous inequality than a meritocratic distribution. 
Disadvantaged participants who were told that the distribution was meritocratic expressed 
more dissent regarding the outcome than those that were randomly disadvantaged. We 
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speculate that not only popular, but also individual meritocratic perceptions are related to 
different income groups’ self-respect.  
Studying a heterogeneous mix of countries, as we have done, can be problematic 
because the historical background of these countries vary strongly. Therefore, we controlled 
for several of these country differences. Moreover, our selection of a broad range of 
industrialised countries increases the generalisability of the results to multiple world regions 
and lends more confidence to the view that the theorised patterns are actually at play.  
Our suggested mechanisms might also shed light on the current embrace of right-wing 
populism in large parts of the world. Right-wing populists are particularly appealing to low-
status individuals because they provide an anti-meritocratic source of group esteem – 
belonging to the right ethnicity. Moreover, right-wing populists seem to express a sort of 
resistance against the meritocratic ‘winners’ in their anti-intellectual narrative. As Streeck 
(2016) has argued, the current economic system may find itself in a serious legitimacy crisis, 
and it may be that populists are successfully exploiting this crisis to gain electoral power. 
Some scholars have argued that researchers should focus on behavioural outcomes of views 
on inequality such as political participation (Han et al., 2012; Janmaat, 2013). The current 




1 With regard to attitudes towards income inequality, the present study focuses on individuals’ 
judgment of the current level of income inequality in their society. 
2 The term ‘meritocracy’ was originally coined by Michael Young (1958) in a dystopian 
satire. He did not consider meritocracy as an ideal gold standard, but instead foresaw the 




3 For the sake of the interpretability of the effect sizes, the original 1 to 5 scoring of the 
variable was left intact. 
4 The results can be requested from the authors. 
 
5 Previous research and our correlation matrix (Table 3, Online Appendix) suggest that many 
people perceive that success is determined by both meritocratic and non-meritocratic factors 
(Reynolds and Xian, 2014). Therefore, a robustness check uses a more critical measure of 
prevalent meritocratic perceptions by calculating the share of people that believed that income 
is only determined by meritocratic factors (see Table 5, Appendix). For this alternative 
measure, separate item scales were computed for the three ‘meritocratic items’ (hard work, 
ambition, own education) and the other five ‘non-meritocratic items’. Individuals who scored 
a minimum of 4 on the first scale and a maximum of 1 on the last scale are labelled as such 
‘true believers’.  
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Notes: Income-based polarisation was calculated by taking the average inequality tolerance level of the three 
highest (self-categorized) income groups (8 to 10) and subtracting from this the average inequality tolerance of 
the three lowest (self-categorized) income groups (1 to 3).  













































































































































































Notes: Education-based polarisation was calculated by taking the average inequality tolerance level of the 33% 
highest (self-categorized) groups (17 to 24) and subtracting from this the average inequality tolerance of the 33% 
lowest (self-categorized) income groups (1 to 8).  








Figure 3. Interaction between income and prevalent meritocratic perceptions. 
 
Notes: the dashed lines represent a 95 per cent confidence interval. Estimations based on Model 2, Table 2. 
Source: ISSP 2009. 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between educational level and prevalent meritocratic perceptions. 
 
Notes: the dashed lines represent a 95 per cent confidence interval. Estimations based on Model 2, Table 2. 
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Individual level     
Inequality tolerance (continuous) 1 5 1.779 .917 
                                 (dichotomous) 0 1 .067 .251 
Income 1 10 5.086 1.789 
Employment status     
    Fulltime  0 1 .466  
    Parttime  0 1    .073    
    Less than parttime  0 1 .018  
    Helping family member 0 1 .005  
    Unemployed 0 1 .075  
    Student 0 1 .059  
    Retired 0 1 .197    
    Homemaker 0 1 .073  
    Disabled 0 1 .017  
    Other 0 1 .019  
Age 15 98 45.869 16.747 
Education (a) 1 24 12.119 3.820 
Social mobility      
    Downward 0 1 .258  
    Stable 0 1 .352  
    Upward 0 1   .390  
Meritocratic perceptions (continuous) 1.143 5 3.448 .489 
                                       (dichotomous) 0 1 .080 .271 
Perception of living in middle class society     
    Yes 0 1 .178  
    No 0 1 .822    
Gender     
    Female 0 1 .540  
    Male 0 1 .460  
National level      
Meritocratic perceptions (continuous) 3.046 3.924 3.445  .201 
                                        (dichotomous) 0 1 .082 .060 
GDP (b) 1836.874   80017.770 27616.880 19275.850 
Gini (c) 24.221 59.488 32.964 7.912 
Upward social mobility (d) .200 .563 .379 .087 
     
Notes: N = 45,699 in 39 countries. 
(a) Education was measured in years of education  
(b) GDP is per capita in current dollars for 2009 
(c) Gini is based on post-tax disposable household income 
(d) The proportion of respondents who indicated that they have moved up the social ladder relative to their 
family of upbringing 




Table 2. Multilevel regression analysis on attitudes towards inequality. 
          
  Model 1       Model 2a      Model 2b     
 b SE  b SE  b SE  
Constant 1.756 (.043) *** 1.756 (.033) *** 1.756 (.043) *** 
Individual level          
Age -0.001 (.000) *** -0.001 (.000) *** -0.001 (.000) *** 
Gender          
  Female (ref.)          
  Male 0.066 (.008) *** 0.066 (.008) *** 0.067 (.008) *** 
Income 0.074 (.008) *** 0.072 (.006) *** 0.074 (.008)  *** 
Education 0.006 (.003) + 0.006 (.003)  + 0.006 (.003) + 
Meritocratic perceptions 0.057 (.009) *** 0.057 (.009) *** 0.057 (.009)  *** 
Perception of living in a middle class society           
  No (ref.)          
  Yes 0.217 (.011) *** 0.217 (.011)  *** 0.217 (.011) *** 
Employment status          
  Full-time (ref.)          
  Part-time -0.028 (.015) + -0.028 (.016) + -0.028 (.015) + 
  Less than part time 0.016 (.030)  0.016 (.030)  0.016 (.030)  
  Helping family member -0.010 (.054)  -0.010 (.054)  -0.009 (.054)  
  Unemployed 0.015 (.016)  0.015 (.016)  0.015 (.016)  
  Student 0.089 (.018) *** 0.089 (.018) *** 0.089 (.018) *** 
  Retired -0.011 (.014)  -0.012 (.014)  -0.012 (.014)  
  Homemaker 0.050 (.017) ** 0.050 (.017) ** 0.050 (.017) ** 
  Disabled -0.066 (.031) * -0.065 (.031) * -0.066 (.031) * 
  Other 0.033 (.030)  0.033 (.030)  0.033 (.030)  
Social mobility history             
  Downward (ref.)          
  Stable -0.004 (.010)  -0.004 (.010)  -0.004 (.104)  
  Upward -0.023 (.011) * -0.023 (.011) * -0.023 (.011) * 
National level          
Gini 0.010 (.006)   0.010 (.006)   0.010 (.006)  
GDP 0.000 (.000)  0.000 (.000)  0.000 (.000)   
Upward social mobility -0.127 (.549)  -0.129 (.550)  -0.137 (.549)  
Meritocratic perceptions 0.817 (.256) ** 0.813 (.257) ** 0.813 (.256) ** 
Cross-level interactions          
Income * Meritocratic perceptions (macro)      0.152 (.033) ***     
Education * Meritocratic perceptions (macro)          0.040 (.016) * 
          
Variance at individual level .824 (.003) *** .824 (.003) *** .824 (.003) *** 
Variance at country level .234 (.027) *** .235 (.027) *** .234 (.027) *** 
Income (random slope) .046 (.006) *** .036 (.005) *** .046 (.006) *** 
Education (random slope) .019 (.002) *** .019 (.003) *** .018 (.002) *** 
-2 log likelihood -56,180.098   -56,171.414   -56,177.239   
Notes: N = 45,699 in 39 countries; unstandardised coefficients; all continuous variables except the individual- 
level control variables are grand-mean centred; + p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 (two-tailed). 
Source: ISSP 2009. 
 
